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Abstract:
Arab countries lag behind the rest of the world on nearly all governance indicators, particularly those related to 
voice and participation. Together with a lack of transparency and low accountability, this has led to greater corrup-
tion and the emergence of the soft state. A sense of alienation and exclusion, especially among youth, contributed 
to popular dissatisfaction, which remains unsolved after the revolution. That is why the research paper focuses on 
ways to improve participation in policymaking and economic planning, and to provide a guiding vision to recover 
from the crisis after the revolution, using Egypt as an example. The paper reviews the experiences of Japan, 
Malaysia and Indonesia, which indicate the importance of achieving a national consensus on an economic vision 
for the future, and the policies and programs needed to achieve it. Successful East Asian countries have put in 
place consultative processes (including different government departments, the private sector and civil society) to 
agree on national development plans and monitor their execution. The situation has been very different in Egypt 
where an institutional coordination mechanism among the various stakeholders to build a national vision was 
missing. The research paper adapts the experiences of East Asia to Egypt’s situation, and presents a proposal for 
introducing the concept of “inclusive planning” in economic planning and policymaking.
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EFFORTS TO INTRODUCE INCLUSIVE 
PLANNING IN EGYPT  
Kei Sakamoto
INTRODUCTION 
Background to the “Arab Uprising”
High economic growth in Egypt between 2000 and 2010 was associated with increasing popular dis-
content.  Favorable macroeconomic growth tends to 
hide the qualitative changes taking place in a society 
(Shimizu, 2011) as seen in Middle Eastern countries, 
which were showing steady macroeconomic growth, 
while economic and social structures with unequal ac-
cess to social services were also emerging. In Egypt, 
obtaining “social justice” became a slogan in the 2011 
revolution. Figure 1 demonstrates this with happiness 
indicators showing the level of discontent toward the 
government among the citizens. The chart indicates 
that the number of people who felt they were thriv-
ing was decreasing despite positive macroeconomic 
growth. As shown in Figure 2, decreasing satisfaction 
in terms of freedom of life also implies the same re-
sult.  The Arab economies of the 1970s and 1980s had 
one of the highest global rates of economic equality, 
but several factors, such as changes in migration pat-
terns, demographic pressures, fiscal retrenchments 
and the rise of corruption have strained the traditional 
sources of inclusive growth (African Development 
Bank, 2012). The growth seen in Egypt could be ex-
pressed as “jobless growth” or “unfair growth,” which 
is no longer acceptable among the citizens.
Inclusive Development
“Inclusive Development represents an approach to 
development that encourages all people to recognize 
the development issues they themselves face, partici-
pate in addressing them, and enjoy the fruits of such 
endeavors.” There has been considerable discussion 
of the importance of inclusive development, sharing 
benefits equally among people, the importance of 
which has reached a consensus in international so-
ciety. The Arab Awakening showed that it is not only 
the quantity but the quality of macroeconomic growth 
that should be emphasized.
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Figure 1: GDP Growth and Happiness
Source: Gallup, 2010.
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Figure 2: Egyptians’ Unrealized Democratic Aspirations
Source: Gallup, 2010.
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Theme of the Paper
The concept of “inclusive development” is broad and 
includes fields of good governance, education reform, 
strengthening of vocational training, labor market 
reform, small and medium enterprise development, 
among other examples. This paper will focus on how 
to incorporate inclusive development in the field of 
governance by improving the development planning 
process. 
Implementing inclusive development requires effec-
tive decision-making processes that ensure an equal 
voice for all citizens. Voice and accountability are criti-
cal weaknesses in Egypt where the government has 
failed to provide for the meaningful participation of 
stakeholders in decision-making. This, together with a 
lack of transparency in government decision-making, 
has led to a widespread lack of accountability. There 
is a strong need in Egypt to build a political basis for 
sustainable economic and institutional reforms to en-
hance inclusiveness. 
The paper aims to examine how a “credible partici-
patory decision-making process to achieve inclusive 
development,” which will be later defined as “inclu-
sive planning,” could be introduced in Egypt; firstly 
by observing the existing challenges in the planning 
process, secondly by studying the experiences and 
lessons of inclusive planning in East Asia, and thirdly 
by focusing on the efforts for planning reform in 
Egypt that followed the 2011 awakening. The process 
of planning and policymaking will be the main focus 
of this paper.
Premise
To achieve inclusive development, introduction of 
inclusive planning is not the only solution. However, 
by focusing our analysis on the development plan-
ning procedure, the paper intends to illustrate the 
social outline that caused the Egyptian uprising and 
the importance of development plans to deal with the 
challenges. Earlier studies indicate that development 
plans play an important role on the economy under 
circumstances where the need for forecasts, aims and 
coordination is acute (Tinbergen, 1964). The evidence 
reveals that Egypt fits well within this socio-political 
model.
Also, this paper will primarily examine the role and re-
sponsibilities of central planning institutions. Indeed, 
there are many levels (both central and local), ways 
and actors (public, private and nongovernmental or-
ganizations) to be considered in terms of introducing 
inclusive planning. However, based on the recogni-
tion of its importance, as suggested by earlier studies 
(Ohno and Shimamura, 2007), we will focus on the 
decision-making process in central government, with 
regard to the importance and critical role of the cen-
tral economic agencies responsible for planning.
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UNFAIR GROWTH WITH GROWING 
DISCONTENT: CHALLENGES FOR 
DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN EGYPT  
Brief History of Development Plans in 
Egypt
Similar to other countries worldwide, development 
planning was introduced in Egypt after its indepen-
dence. The Industrial Five-year Plan (1957–1962) 
aimed to enhance domestic industrialization and was 
the first such plan in Egypt. This was followed by the 
first Five-Year Plan (1960-64), drafted by the National 
Planning Committee in President Nasser’s era. Based 
on the introduction of “Arab socialism” in 1962, state 
intervention and central planning was regarded as in-
creasingly important during this time (Ikram, 2004).
President Sadat, who adopted the open-door eco-
nomic policy, “Infitah,” implemented several policies 
to introduce free liberalization and economic de-
regulation, strengthening the economic capacity for 
inviting foreign direct investment. The revised invest-
ment law became the Five-Year Development Plan 
(1977–1982). With a break from Arab socialism, the 
influence of central development planning began to 
decline with a commensurate increase in private sec-
tor development.
It was during the era of President Mubarak, who be-
came president in 1981, that the system of five-year 
development plans was settled. As economic policies 
based on the free market economy were continued 
and enhanced, development plans turned out to be 
too rigid, with negligible impact on the economy. 
Although Prime Minister Nazif’s privatization reforms 
brought strong economic growth, they also caused 
increased corruption. In this context, Egypt’s eco-
nomic growth, with concomitant corruption, actually 
brought about what can be termed as “unfair growth.” 
Consequently, there was broad discontent among 
the millions who were left without any benefit, or in 
many cases even worse off than in the absence of the 
reforms. Fakhouri introduces the analysis of the shift 
from Nasser to Sadat and then to Mubarak as “a shift 
from the government-directed economic model to the 
free economic model, then a shift to the uncontrol-
lable economic model.” (Fakhouri, 2010) This paper 
tries to suggest the importance of a “new shift” in 
development plans for Egypt as a key driver for its 
achievement of inclusive growth. Table 1 shows the 
brief history of planning in Egypt.
Table 1: History of Planning in Egypt
President Plan
Naser (1956-1970) 1st 5 year plan (1960-1964)
Sadat (1971-1981) 5 year plan (1977-1982)
Mubarak (1981-2011) 1st 5 year plan (1982-1986)
2nd 5 year plan (1987-1991)
3rd 5 year plan (1992-1996)
4th 5 year plan (1997-2001)
5th 5 year plan (2002-2006)
6th 5 year plan (2007-2011)
Transitional/Morsi (2012-) Proposal for New Development Plan (2012-2022)
Source: Author.
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Plan Without an Institutional 
Dialogue Mechanism
Planning Procedures in the Sixth Five-Year 
Plan
Lack of dialogue among key stakeholders is a key fea-
ture of the planning process in Egypt.  Findings from 
the field research show that the budget allocation 
was determined before drafting the economic goals 
and strategies in the previous master plan’s drafting 
process. The first planning step was the production of 
the “investment budget allocation sheet,” which was 
incorporated in the Ministry of Planning based on the 
investment budget request prepared by each of the 
ministries.1 The contents of the five-year development 
plan were then drafted by the Ministry of Planning 
based on the budget allocation sheet. The plan was 
initially drafted by university scholars, whose names 
never appeared in the plan, and the drafted plan was 
then integrated in a division inside the Ministry of 
Planning. This system was simple with drafting being 
fully completed inside the Ministry of Planning with-
out official “outside contacts” (Tinbergen, 1964).2
This system, although efficient, also led to the exclu-
sion of major stakeholders, such as the private sector, 
civil society organizations, labor organization and the 
media, all of whom were neglected in the development 
planning process. Indeed, one executive of an interna-
tional company in Egypt stated that the “private sec-
tor was excluded during the decision-making process, 
where the government decided the policy on its own.”3 
Another executive, in a business association, revealed 
that “the development plans never attracted the pri-
vate sector, which was a plan that no one has ever 
read.”4 Consequently, development plans, which had 
little external interaction during the planning process, 
lacked mechanisms for building consensus among the 
major stakeholders for economic development.
A Dialogue Without a Mechanism
Conversely, studies show the existence of strong in-
teractions between the government and the private 
sector (Wakabayashi, 2007). Prime Minister Ahmed 
Nazif’s cabinet, from July 2004 to January 2011, in-
troduced wide-ranging reforms to strengthen the 
public/private sector relations, spearheaded by Prime 
Minister Nazif, who appointed ministers from the 
private sector as represented by Mohamed Rachid, 
the minister of trade and industry. During the Nazif 
administration, it is said that the executives of major 
private companies in Egypt were able to directly com-
municate with Minister Rachid by mobile phones.5
Despite the strong relationship between public and 
private sectors, the problem was that communication 
and cooperation were implemented without an institu-
tional dialogue mechanism (Benhassine, 2009), lead-
ing to numerous collusive relationships that resulted 
in corruption. Some privileged private companies ben-
efited, while others were left in the lurch. This social 
structure represents the background to the Egyptian 
uprising in 2011, where those demonstrating were ac-
cusing an individual person, Ahmad Ezz, of being the 
model of a “corrupted business person.” The problem 
was the lack of a rule-based institutional dialogue be-
tween public and private sectors.
A Dialogue Without a Mechanism and the 
2011 Uprising 
The absence of an institutional dialogue mechanism 
resulted in an increase in corruption, which people 
decided to combat. It is often said that the corruption 
during the 2010 election, the death of Khaled Saeed (a 
young man who was brutally killed by the police), and 
the labor demonstration in El Mahalla El-Kubra in the 
Nile Delta were the major incidents that helped trig-
ger the uprising in Egypt. These incidents, along with 
the demonstrations in 2011, reveal that the Egyptian 
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people are determined to achieve “social justice” by 
fighting against “suppression” and cleaning out “cor-
ruption” (Nagasawa, 2012). During the labor demon-
stration in El Mahalla El-Kubra, the demonstrators 
claimed that corrupt companies in turn corrupted the 
country, causing dissatisfaction with corruption to 
surge nationwide. This spreading discontent exploded 
in 2011, triggered by similar movements in Tunisia.
While numerous demonstrators were youths, wide-
ranging stakeholders, such as government officials, 
media officials, professors, lawyers, engineers, court 
judges, farmers and businesspersons, also joined the 
movement. Businesspersons who participated in the 
demonstration claimed that Prime Minister Nazif’s 
privatization policies were corrupt. People were op-
posed to economic development that benefited only 
the privileged, and called for “free and fair growth.”
Incidents clarify that people were dissatisfied with the 
opaque political decision-making process. Even the 
Egyptian labor organization, which normally repre-
sents the interest of workers, was mired in corruption. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) positively 
Figure 3: Voiced Opinion to Public Official
Source: Gallup, 2010.
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evaluated the decision of the new minister of finance, 
who allowed the freedom to formulate trade unions 
after the revolution. Egypt was counted as one of the 
25 worst countries in the world in terms of violating 
the international labor agreement (ibid). As few peo-
ple shared the benefits of growth, many citizens were 
unable to express their views to the government, as 
indicated in Figure 3. Only 4 percent of Egyptians said 
they were able to express their opinion to a public of-
ficial, which was the lowest level in Gallup’s 150-coun-
try database.
A History of Increasing Corruption: The Road 
to a “Soft State”
Previous studies (Amin 2011, Nagasawa, 2012) explain 
the growing level of corruption by dividing Egypt into 
three eras after independence: the monarchy era, the 
Nasser era, and the Sadat/Mubarak era. The study 
shows that there was a low sense of corruption in 
the monarchy era, when the country suffered from 
colonial rule. Nasser’s era experienced a growth in 
suppression, but little in corruption, based on the 
modesty of the president’s personal character. The 
study indicates that it was in the third era that cor-
ruption spread nationwide, due to the loss of the war 
in 1967, Sadat’s character and globalization resulting 
from the open-door economic policy. This era suffered 
from the burden of the “soft state.” 6
During Mubarak’s era, Nagasawa describes the ex-
istence of a “pyramid of corruption,” with the presi-
dent at the top and family members, politicians, 
ministers and business people supporting the regime 
(Nagasawa, 2012). The corruption in the adminis-
tration, such as with Prime Minister Nazif, Gamal 
Mubarak7 and Ahmad Ezz,8 is often said to be the best 
example of the pyramid of corruption. This pyramid 
structure was hard to remove, leading Egypt to be-
come a soft state, with growing corruption (ibid).
This fact could also be confirmed by governance indi-
cators. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
showed a decline in governance indicators for voice 
and accountability, corruption control and govern-
ment effectiveness (trust in government, consistency 
of policy direction, consensus-building and public 
satisfaction with services). Egypt showed a significant 
decrease from 2000 to 2010 for voice and account-
ability (24.5 to 13.3), corruption control (43.4 to 34.4) 
and government effectiveness (46.8 to 40.2). These 
figures indicate the lack and decline of transparency 
in the government decision-making process and the 
reality of Egypt being essentially a soft state. 9
Table 2: Burden for Citizens after Independence in Egypt
Three Eras Type of Burden Key Issues
Monarchy Era  
(1922-1953)
Burden of Subordination Colonial Rule
Naser’s Era  
(1956-1970)
Burden of Tyranny
Independence but 
Suppression 
Sadat and Mubarak’s Era  
(1971-2011)
Burden of Soft state Corruption
Source: Author based on Amin 2011 and  Nagasawa, 2012.
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A lack of fairness and transparency in governance 
resulted in unfair competition, insufficient support 
for the poor, and the creation and preservation of an 
income gap in society (World Bank, 2009). In particu-
lar, corruption disturbed the efficiency of government 
services in addressing disparity. To achieve inclusive 
growth, where the benefit of growth reaches the poor, 
corruption must be controlled with a mechanism that 
includes the voices of people from various classes, 
creating a policy consensus that benefits all. In sum, 
the pursuit of social justice was the engine that led the 
people filled with discontent at the lack of inclusion, to 
demonstrate. The planning procedure and history of 
the fall to a soft state have revealed the background 
to the growing discontent in the country.
Scattered Knowledge
One of the challenges related to the absence of an 
institutional dialogue mechanism during the planning 
process was the dispersal of plans and knowledge, 
which requires integration.
Although the five-year plan was regarded as the ma-
jor national plan, our surveys have found that 41 plans 
existed in various forms: 14 “plans,” three “visions,” 
seven “strategies,” and three “programs,” among oth-
ers. These 41 plans were individually drafted by min-
istries and relevant organizations with support from 
international donors. The problem here was the ab-
sence of interrelation among them and linkage to the 
five-year plans, which should have acted as the guid-
Figure 4: Governance Indicators in Egypt 
Source: Gallup, 2010.
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ing vision for each of the individual plans. There is a 
large challenge in integrating these scattered plans in 
a functional way to act as a guiding vision for national 
development. An organization or system to integrate 
knowledge, and wisdom to draft an effective plan was 
also missing.
A Plan Lacking Implementation
Another challenge was the lack of a strategy for im-
plementation. A plan shows its value when it has been 
implemented. Experts suggest that “development is 
a process that must be undertaken at the level of the 
nation-state as the implementing unit” (Ohno and 
Shimamura, 2007). The problem with the planning in 
Egypt was the lack of its execution.
Since the five-year plans in Egypt were drafted inside 
one section of the ministry without building consen-
sus among major stakeholders, including each of the 
ministries who were the real implementers, the na-
tional plan was simply a concept paper that did not 
call for execution. Accordingly, many plans, visions 
and strategies were well prepared but never imple-
mented.
It needs to be noted that the idea of inclusion of major 
stakeholders into the planning process was not a new 
concept in Egypt. For example, Handoussa,(2010) pro-
posed  a  mechanism for including academics and civil 
society organizations during the planning process. 
However, the proposals were difficult to implement 
due to the absence of a strong implementation unit. 
Figure 5: Anxiety Among Society After the Revolution
Source: Gallup, 2010.
More Egyptians express fear,despite a slight decline in reported crime.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
2008 2009 2010 Spring 2011
Money/Property stolen Assaulted or mugged in past year Feel unsafe walking alone 
10 GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
Further, inadequate administrative capacity at the 
ministry level was another factor hampering imple-
mentation.
Egypt’s Post Revolution Obstacles
The uprising in 2011 succeeded in razing the sup-
pressive regime. However, a significant number 
of challenges remain for the new government. 
Demonstrations in Tahrir Square reflect the discon-
tent that lingers, and remains the only outlet for 
some marginalized individuals to voice their concerns. 
Further, news sources indicate a rise in the crime rate 
after the revolution, while Gallup polls indicate in-
creased anxiety among citizens (Gallup, 2011).
The growing uncertainly of the economic situation 
also amplifies national anxiety. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the GDP growth 
rate was 1.75 percent in 2011, and is expected to be 
2.0 percent in 2012.10 Following the uprising, the un-
employment rate has risen from 9 to 12.4 percent, 
and foreign reserves have declined from $43 billion 
to $15 billion.11 Moreover, the number of stakeholders 
in Egypt has rapidly increased;12 a balkanization that 
carries with it the potential of future division and re-
sulting chaos.
In light of these factors, the “National Dialogue” was 
carried out by the transitional government to help 
forge a sense of national consensus (Galal, 2011). 
While this event represented an initial step toward 
establishing dialogue, participants indicate that “the 
National Dialogue did not create a solution or consen-
sus but brought chaos where people were expressing 
and pressing their own ideas.”13 Accordingly, the evi-
dence indicates that an institutional system, one with 
the necessary capacity for creating national consen-
sus and a guiding vision to overcome needs after the 
revolution, was urgently needed.
Inclusive Planning as a Way to 
Overcome the Challenges
We have examined how dialogues without a proper 
institutional mechanism, scattered knowledge and 
barriers to implementation represent the three pri-
mary challenges confronting Egyptian development 
objectives. Indeed, inadequate dialogue mechanisms 
contributed to the perception of Egypt as a soft state. 
In this context, the revolution was driven by the ex-
asperation of the Egyptian people, who were fed up 
with increasing near-endemic levels of corruption. 
However, the revolution did not solve these chal-
lenges, and concerns are rising or remain that the 
fractioned society may be moving toward a period of 
increasing tension. A clear vision to stabilize and over-
come the post-revolution difficulties is needed.
 In light of these factors, the need to establish a de-
fined mechanism for dialogue, and one free from 
corruption cannot be overstated.  It is the founda-
tion and the necessary first step toward building a 
national consensus. The Egyptian people have voiced 
their discontent and their hopes. Now, as the evidence 
resoundingly reflects, they demand a credible na-
tional decision-making framework. As a prerequisite 
to achieving this credibility, the mechanism must be 
one based on uniform, fair rules; and in counterpart, 
the institutional capacity of Egyptian implementation 
agencies must be bolstered to properly carry out their 
functions. To achieve these goals, a new role for devel-
opment plans and a new institutional planning proce-
dure, which will be described as inclusive planning, will 
be examined in the next chapter.
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INCLUSIVE PLANNING THE 
IMPORTANCE OF PROCEDURES 
AND THE LESSONS FROM EAST 
ASIA
What is Inclusive Planning?
There are two main sources of economic planning 
in history: communist planning and western macro-
economic planning (Tinbergen, 1964). In this context, 
we consider the latter as the basis, which was intro-
duced to most capitalist societies after World War II.14 
Economic planning has declined in several developed 
and developing countries, with the importance of the 
private sector, local governments and civil society or-
ganizations actually growing. There are also studies in 
the 1990s suggesting the “decreasing effect” of cen-
tral planning (Balassa, 1990).
However, this paper suggests a new and important 
role of central economic planning in the 21st century 
based on recent studies that claim central planning 
plays a vital role during the early stages (i.e. recovery 
stage) of development, where the role of develop-
ment planning is an instrument for achieving sustain-
able economic growth and social justice (Ohno and 
Shimamura, 2007). There are two basic roles of the 
new plan: the introduction of democratic procedure 
into policymaking, and the creation of a growth vision 
for a mid- to long-term economic recovery. 
Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in 
his presentation of the new economic plan in 2011, in-
dicated that “It is impossible to achieve our long-term 
economic goals without the master plan. We also can’t 
rely wholly on market mechanisms. The government’s 
Figure 6: Inclusive Planning Structure (1)
Source: Based on JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
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role, as a ‘visible hand’, is important” (Sato, 2011).  This 
paper emphasizes the possibility of a development 
plan playing an important role as a “visible hand” 
in Egypt in terms of sustaining its economic growth 
while promoting consensus-building among major 
stakeholders.
As we examined in the previous chapter, institutional 
dialogue between stakeholders remains a crucial fac-
tor in keeping national consensus equitable and in 
fair economic growth. In this chapter, the process of 
establishing this “institutional dialogue mechanism” 
to include major stakeholders in the planning process 
(i.e. the decision-making process), will be defined as 
“inclusive planning,” and will be analyzed in accor-
dance with the East Asian experience. A clear defini-
tion of inclusive planning does not exist, where the 
phrase is used on various occasions. Sometimes it 
is used in the field of urban planning, which seeks to 
build a barrier-free planning method, and occasionally 
it is used in the field of health, which attempts to ad-
dress the significance of a disability inclusive planning 
process.
In this paper, the term inclusive planning will be used 
to describe the central planning procedure (inclusive 
process) for achieving inclusive development (inclu-
sive aim), which requires the inclusion of major stake-
holders (inclusive actors) in the planning process to 
build a national consensus while integrating the coun-
try’s knowledge (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Inclusive Planning Structure (2)
Source: Author.
Inclusive 
Development
“Inclusive” Time Frame
“Inclusive” Process
“Inclusive” aim
Inclusive Planning
Stakeholder StakeholderStakeholder
Stakeholder StakeholderStakeholder
“Inclusive” Actors
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Also noteworthy is the fact that inclusive planning 
requires plans to be a guiding vision for develop-
ment. An inclusive plan must adopt a mid to long-term 
perspective; not only examining short-term goals 
(inclusive time frame) where new governments of-
ten address populist attractive short-term policies. 
Inclusive planning reminds us of the importance of 
including long-term perspectives during the planning 
procedure. It should be noted here that introducing 
a democratic planning process will take time. To de-
velop democracy as well as stabilize the political and 
economic situation after the revolution, this paper 
stresses the importance of “institutionalization” and 
capacity development of planning organizations in 
policy planning procedures, as the initial measures to 
be taken. It should be recognized that the excessive 
inclusion of stakeholders in the initial stage will create 
political anarchy rather than harmonization.
To achieve inclusive planning, the first step is to es-
tablish a fair institutional mechanism for increasing 
outside contacts. Tinbergen indicates three main rea-
sons for the importance of outside contacts during 
the planning period (Tinbergen, 1964).
First, participation from outsiders in the planning pro-
cess allows opinions to be exchanged with those oper-
ating the economy and thus introduces some features 
of democracy.15 Second, detailed information can be 
obtained from a number of outside experts, which in-
dicates the quality of the economic plan will improve, 
with the plan being more strategic. Third, the feature 
of democracy will help facilitate the plan’s acceptance, 
as well as its implementation. 
Fourth, adding another aspect to Tinbergen’s analysis, 
long-term inclusive aim is an important factor for in-
Table 3: Matrix Relation Between Challenges, Necessary Reforms and Earlier Studies
Objective Challenges facing 
Development Planning 
Necessary Reforms
Tinbergen’s analysis 
of the importance of 
Outside Contacts
Method
Inclusive 
Development
Dialogue without 
Mechanism
Consensus-
Building based 
on Rules
1. Creating 
Features of 
Democracy
Inclusive 
planning
Scattered 
Knowledge
Integrating 
National 
Knowledge
2. Integrating 
Expertise
Lack of Plan 
Implementation
Strengthening of 
Implementation 
Mechanism
3. Facilitate 
Implementation
Post Revolution 
Obstacles
Guiding Vision 
for Stability 
and Economic 
Recovery 
<Missing> 
East Asian 
Experience
Source: Author based on Tinbergen 1964.
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clusive planning, creating a mutual and shared vision 
toward inclusive growth among major stakeholders 
and citizens. Table 3 describes the relation between 
the challenges, necessary reforms, and Tinbergen’s 
suggestion in earlier studies, which explains the idea 
of inclusive planning.
Lessons from the East Asian 
Experience
The fast-growing “Tiger” East Asian economies of the 
1960s and 1970s were the first group of post-indepen-
dence developing countries to develop strategies for 
inclusive growth (African Development Bank, 2012). 
Based on the recognition of inclusive planning, this 
section will examine the effects of inclusive planning 
based on the actual experience in East Asia.
The East Asian growth experience, especially after 
World War II in Japan and after the Asian economic 
crisis in Indonesia, shows the success of governments 
developing mechanisms for effective dialogue in their 
societies and setting priorities for public actions to 
foster inclusive growth (ibid). It is often suggested 
that the creation of central economic agencies re-
sponsible for development planning and coordination 
was the key factor behind the “East Asian miracle” 
(National Graduate Institute of Policy Studies, 2008), 
and mobilization of all stakeholders toward a long-
term economic goal is said to be a strong feature of 
growth in East Asia (Benhassine, 2009). Of course, 
the effects of development plans differ in each coun-
try; however their experience with inclusive planning 
provides a useful reference against which to introduce 
the concept. The experience of three countries in East 
Asia; Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia will be assessed 
considering the following factors: 1) establishing an 
institutional consensus-building mechanism; 2) inte-
grating knowledge; and 3) securing and strengthening 
the implementation of plans based on the studies of 
Tinbergen.
Our analysis adds one more aspect to Tinbergen’s 
examination; a plan acting as a guiding vision. 
Participatory policymaking, including as many stake-
holders as possible in the policymaking process, is 
theoretically important for enhancing democracy. 
However, compared to western society with its long 
experience of developing democracy, there are cer-
tain difficulties in adopting a participatory system in 
states with less democratic experience. The experi-
ence of East Asian counties shows that as well as the 
participatory policymaking process, a plan for a guid-
ing vision is important in inclusive development.
Kondo explains four positive conditions (the prior 
experience of democracy, prior experience of civil-
ian leadership, less experience of military domination 
and prior achievement of economic development) 
for democracy to be settled (Kondo, 2011 based on 
Huntington 1991, Linz et al 1996, Diamond 1999, Lipset 
1959). Egypt seems to be one of the countries that 
has less experience with these conditions. However, 
East Asian countries also had the same problem. 
Kondo states that it is more important to target po-
litical institutionalization (including enhancement of 
bureaucratic structures and institutionalizing public-
private partnerships) and economic achievements, 
rather than aim to deepen democracy (Kondo, 2011). 
Establishing and rooting democracy will certainly take 
time, and it is important to adopt a long-term perspec-
tive and vision.
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Inclusive Planning, a Consensus-
Building Mechanism: Lessons from 
Japan
Japanese Economic Planning
In Japan, economic plans played a significant role in its 
economic recovery from the ravaging effects of World 
War II. Indeed, Japan developed 14 economic plans 
after the end of the war. If we include the draft plans, 
which were not officially approved, the total number 
would be 24. The first economic plan was established 
immediately after the war, with economic recovery 
as its core objective. Following the first officially ap-
proved plan in 1955, the Japanese economic plans can 
be divided into four groups: the first group targeted 
reconstruction and independence (first plan), the sec-
ond group aimed for high economic growth (second 
and third plans), the third group tried to balance eco-
nomic growth with social development (fourth to sixth 
plans), and the fourth group strived for stable growth 
(seventh to 14th plans) (Keizaikikakucho, 1997).
The Economic Council (“Shingikai”): A 
Mechanism for Inclusive Planning
Japanese economic plans were designed not only 
as guidelines for growth, but also as instruments to 
guide future policy decisions. Japan’s economic coun-
cil was the planning mechanism employed to achieve 
these objectives.16
Figure 8: Planning Process in the Japanese Economic Council
Source: Based on JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
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The economic council was designed as an organization 
to create a national consensus and integrate expertise 
within the country. Japanese economic plans were 
drafted by the economic council, while the contents 
were implemented under each ministry. The economic 
council was established in 1952, under the Ministry of 
Economy and Trading Industry, as the advisory body 
for the prime minister. This was one of the official 
councils established under Article 8 of the National 
Government Organization Act, and Articles 37 and 
54 of the Cabinet Office Establishment Act. There are 
currently 115 official councils in Japan.17 The economic 
council integrated the wisdom and knowledge from 
each sector, such as the academic, economic, private, 
media and social organization sectors, and played a 
key role in coordinating interests and conflicts among 
stakeholders. Academics evaluated the council for its 
externality, expertise and communicative function 
(ibid). Based on the official reports, Table 4 describes 
the characteristics of the organization (ibid).
The inclusion of the implementer — the ministries — 
during the planning procedure was the key factor in 
Japanese plans being implemented. It is important 
Table 4: Japanese Economic Council
Role Activities
1) Economic Planning Drafting the indicative economic plan.
2) Long-Term Visions
Providing a 20-year vision and 
helping create a future vision among 
citizens.
3) Policy Recommendation Specific topics or areas.
Members
The chosen members were fewer than 30 people, represented by economists, 
academics, representative of labor unions, representative of consumers, medias and 
government officials. Under the council, there were several task forces (about 200 
members).
Achievements
1) Building a consensus between government and citizens, through objective and 
technical knowledge.
2) Providing mid- to long-term guidelines for activities for the private sector, 
contributing to economic development.18
3) Contributing to sharing of information between government and citizens.
Developmental 
Dissolution
 In 2001, the function was succeeded by the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy; 
strengthening the leadership of the prime minister as chief of this council. In 2009, 
the National Policy Unit was established.
Source: Author based on Amin 2011 and  Nagasawa, 2012.
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to note that inclusive planning with the participation 
of implementers binds each ministry and creates re-
sponsibility in implementing the discussed contents 
of the plan.
Income Doubling Plan (1960): A Plan as a 
Guiding Vision
The greatest achievement of the economic planning 
council in Japan is often said to be the creation of 
the Income Doubling Plan (1960). This was the third 
plan to be drafted after World War II, aiming to double 
real national income within 10 years and achieve full 
employment. The plan, which contributed significantly 
to Japanese reconstruction and development, also 
provided a guiding vision for the public and private 
sectors in Japan. According to the then Economic 
Planning Agency in Japan, it showed three character-
istics (ibid).
First, the plan divided the public and private sectors, 
with the government fully responsible for achiev-
ing the public sector goals, while the private sector 
goals were simply predictive. It was the first time 
that Japanese planning had integrated the private 
sector into the plan and sent a strong message that 
the engine of development should be led by the pri-
vate sector. This was important in that the plan was 
not only for public policy, but also provided a vision 
for development for the private sector. The plan also 
clarified the public sector’s role in enhancing social 
capital, improving human capacity, promoting science 
and technology, enhancing social security, improving 
social welfare and the induction of private industry.
Second, human resource development was a signifi-
cant area of focus in the plan. The plan emphasized 
the importance of education, vocational training and 
science technology from a long-term perspective.
 Third, approaches to correct gaps in various fields 
were comprehensively taken into account for the first 
time in Japanese planning. Gaps such as income gap, 
productivity differential, and urban and rural gaps 
were discussed and reviewed during the planning pro-
cess. Also, anti-poverty was regarded as the central 
issue of social security, and the plan emphasized the 
promotion of social welfare measures. In Japanese 
history, the plan is often criticized as overemphasiz-
ing economic development, creating a regional gap 
and pollution nationwide. Indeed, the plan could not 
be highly evaluated as a success story in Japan in 
this field, but its concept and idea provide lessons for 
achieving economic growth as well as strengthening 
social security.
The plan achieved its goal within just seven years, al-
lowing Japan to step in as a member of the developed 
world.19 This plan shall be a benchmark for the new 
development plan in Egypt, which will be examined in 
the third chapter.
In addition, it should also be noted that Japanese de-
velopment plans have recently become less effective. 
Although the 15th Japanese development plan shows 
frequent consultation among citizens of Japan, no 
nationwide social consensus was achieved. This real-
ity shows the importance of the plan as a “guiding 
vision,” rather than just a means of participation. The 
Income Doubling Plan should be reevaluated; not only 
for Egypt but also for current Japanese development.
Inclusive Planning in Indonesia 
(Development Planning Committee 
“Musrenbang”)
Development Planning Under Suharto
Several common factors can be observed between 
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Egypt under Mubarak and Indonesia under Suharto, 
such as the experience of a long dictatorship, high 
GDP growth, improvements in Human Development 
Indicators (HDI) and the existence of major corruption 
in public and private sectors. With the success story 
in democratization after the collapse of the Suharto 
regime in 1997, many experts suggest that Indonesia 
offers some lessons for Egypt (Amin et al, 2012; 
Kaufman, 2011; African Development Bank, 2012).
In Indonesia, it was during the Suharto era that the 
five-year development plan “REPELITA” (Rencana 
Pembangunan Lima Tahun) and the 25-year long-term 
vision were drafted and implemented. The Ministry of 
National Development Planning (BAPPENAS, Badan 
Perencanaan Pembang-unan Nasional) was in charge 
of preparation, and the budget plan was drafted based 
on these plans. It also coordinated and monitored for-
eign aid. Under the Suharto regime, BAPPNEAS was 
the engine of development and drafted six economic 
plans.
Democratization Reform After 1997: The 
Democratization Process
The Indonesian case implies the importance of 
stakeholder inclusion during the planning process. 
The Asian economic crisis in 1997 and the collapse 
of the Suharto regime brought dramatic changes 
to Indonesia. From this incident, Indonesia started 
down the path to becoming a democratic nation. 
Development through a democratic and transpar-
ent process was needed following strong criticism 
of corruption in the Suharto regime. Many reforms 
Figure 9: Governance Indicators in Indonesia 
Source: World Governance Indicators. 
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were implemented, such as the introduction of the 
decentralization law, the establishment of a new 
partnership between government and civil society to 
fight corruption, the establishment of the Corruption 
Eradication Commission and the formation of an in-
dependent Socio-Economic Monitoring and Research 
Unit (SMERU) (Amin et al, 2012). The dramatic im-
provement in governance indicators indicates suc-
cessful results. In addition, although the direct impact 
of the measures introduced above was small, the im-
pact in terms of confidence and the sense of inclusion 
among people was significant (African Development 
Bank, 2012).
Introduction of a New Transparent Inclusive 
Planning System
The fall of the Suharto regime brought some changes 
in the decision-making process, from a top-down 
planning process to a bottom-up approach, including 
several levels of citizens. The National Development 
Planning System Law, formulated in 2004, enforced 
the development planning committee (Musrembang: 
Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan). Citizen 
representatives joined this committee during the plan-
ning procedure, working to adjust the stakeholders’ 
perspectives. Of course, this took considerable effort 
and time, but the government of Indonesia recognized 
the step as a necessary cost for democratization and 
good governance (Iijima, 2005). Consequently, by 
establishing the Development Planning Committee, 
coordination between stakeholders became institu-
tionalized, creating a consensus, which consequently 
allowed the voices of citizens to be reflected in poli-
cies (ibid). From the 2nd Yudhoyono administration in 
2009, national dialogues with the 32 governors and 
chief executive officers of the chambers of commerce 
were organized once every several months to build 
consensus and ownership of the major implement-
ers (local government and the private sector) for the 
new economic plan that was announced in 2011 (Sato, 
2011). This trend can be recognized as the achieve-
ment and development of inclusive planning.
Malaysia: The Importance of a Strong 
Implementation Body
Strength of Malaysia
The World Bank report implies that the engine for 
Malaysian economic growth stems largely from the 
prime minister’s strong leadership and the organi-
zational strength of the economic planning bureau, 
which drafted, monitored and evaluated the economic 
plans under the prime minister’s office (World Bank, 
1993 cited in Torii, 2005). The United Nations evalu-
ation report also stressed that a system for planning, 
monitoring and evaluation contributed to Malaysia’s 
socio-economic success (United Nations, 2001). This 
section will summarize the basic points and impor-
tance of a strong implementation body in Malaysia, 
which could serve as the model for establishing a bet-
ter implementation mechanism in Egypt.
A Strong Implementation Body (The Prime 
Minister’s Office) Drafting and Implementing 
the Plan
After attaining independence in 1957, the govern-
ment invited the World Bank evaluation unit to draft 
a report for central development planning. Based on 
its findings, a small economic planning bureau was 
established. In 1961, the bureau was upgraded to the 
Economic Planning Unit (EPU), which was attached 
to the prime minister’s office. It is often said that the 
EPU functioned as a “super-ministry,” which took the 
leading role in formulating the coordination plans with 
the National Budget Office (Ohno and Shimamura, 
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2007). The EPU was also in charge of drafting five-
year plans, as well as their mid-term reviews.20
The implementation function was strengthened dur-
ing the period of the second prime minister, Najib 
Razak, as he adopted the New Economic Policy 
(NEP). In 1971, he established the Implementation 
Coordination Unit (ICU) under the prime minister’s 
office. This was a unit to implement the plan and 
make arrangements with each ministry. By placing 
the EPU and the ICU under the authority of the prime 
minister’s office, the government created a strong 
administrative body. Further, the two units inside the 
prime minister’s office collaborated, united by com-
mon objectives. In sum, the system helped bolster the 
efficiency and success of planning implementation.
The fourth prime minister, Mahathir, strengthened the 
implementation function further by including various 
stakeholders and introduced a public-private dialogue 
system, at regional as well as federal levels. For ex-
ample, in 1988, a system for an annual public-private 
dialogue meeting was introduced, institutionally se-
curing the participation of the private sector in the 
national planning process and which was comparable 
to the Japanese Economic Council system.
Malaysia had two levels of decision-making institu-
tions for national planning: one at the administrative 
level (National Development Planning Committee) and 
one at the ministerial level (National Development 
Council). In addition, the National Development 
Working Committee (NDC), in charge of monitoring 
the implementation at the administrative level, was 
established to enhance implementation, while at a 
state level, the State Development Council and State 
Development Working Committee were established 
to plan and implement the development plans within 
the state.
Strong Monitoring System
While impact evaluation at the project level was un-
dertaken by each of the ministries, it was the ICU that 
conducted the impact evaluation at the macro level. 
The ICU also developed various monitoring systems, 
which involved the periodic collection and analysis 
of physical and financial data. Some examples of 
a strong monitoring system were the “Red Book 
System,” providing a monthly reporting format for 
rural development, and the Integrated Scheduling 
Application System (SIAP), a physical monitoring sys-
tem for development projects. This Malaysian experi-
ence of a strong implementation and monitoring unit 
could provide positive lessons to Egypt. 
Table 5: Summary of Planning Experience of East Asia (Japan, Indonesia and Malaysia)
Japan Stakeholder inclusion through Economic Council (“Shingikai”). 
Income Doubling Plan as a guiding vision.
Indonesia Stakeholder inclusion through Development Planning Committee (“Musrenbang”).
Malaysia Prime minister’s office as a strong implementation body. 
Strong monitoring system.
Source: Author.
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Box 1: The Characteristics of Japanese Assistance to Democratic Transition based on East 
Asian Views
The definition of governance and democracy varies significantly among countries, cultures, organizations 
and people. Therefore, assistance toward “Democratic Transition” should be carefully executed to avoid 
imposing agendas or thoughts on the recipient country. Referring to Vergianita’s analysis using earlier 
studies (Vergianita, 2010), the Japanese democratic assistance was implemented through a development 
approach (indirect democratization support where recipient and donors collaborate emphasizing partner-
ship), rather than a political approach (direct democratization support to political actors through training, 
advice and economic assistance).
Japan’s emphasis on partnership reflects the actual Japanese development experience, also seen in the 
East Asian miracle, which Ohno describes as the “East Asian View” (Ohno, 2009). The East Asian View is 
an idea where ownership is the top priority. It requires and emphasizes collaborative work with donors, 
and secondly adopts a target-oriented approach, where the positive potential for growth is highly valued, 
and does not focus solely on binding constraints. Ohno suggests that the East Asian development experi-
ence is not a model, but a process of capacity development based on the East Asian View.
The Japanese development approach method and the East Asian View included mutual concepts of col-
laboration, which describe the characteristics of democracy assistance in East Asia. The experience of 
inclusive planning assistance based on this idea in East Asia is described in Table 6. The development 
strategies were drafted through collaborative work, and the drafted strategies were used to mobilize for-
eign aid and private investment (Ohno, 2009).
The Japanese assistance with inclusive planning in Egypt, as described in Chapter 3, is based on these 
experiences.
Table 6: Examples  of Japanese Assistance of Inclusive Planning 
Country Project Time
Vietnam
Joint Vietnamese-Japanese Research Project: Study on the 
Economic Development Policy in the Transition toward a Market-
Oriented Economy in Vietnam “Ishikawa Project.”
1995-2001
Indonesia Program for Economic Policy Support for the Republic of 
Indonesia.
2002-2005
Laos Macroeconomic Policy Support. 2000-2006
Source: Ohno, 2009.
22 GLOBAL ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
EFFORTS AND PROSPECTS FOR 
APPLYING INCLUSIVE PLANNING 
IN EGYPT
New Role of the Development Plan in 
Egypt
A Plan for Inclusive Growth
The paper has examined the challenges in Egypt, as 
well as the necessary measures for achieving inclu-
sive planning based on the experiences of East Asian 
countries. The final chapter will introduce the actual 
efforts to reform the planning procedures taken in 
Egypt after 2011. This effort was led by the Ministry 
of Planning with the support of a JICA expert.21 The 
newly established central planning organization, the 
Planning Committee, was responsible for drafting the 
new development plan. The plan is under preparation 
for official presentation, with opinions currently be-
ing collected from the public.22 The new plan has two 
characteristics. First, it holds the role of a guiding vi-
sion. The plan aimed to provide a long-term develop-
ment vision, while in the short term, it aimed to state 
a clear national vision for the country to overcome its 
economic difficulties after the revolution. Second, the 
plan introduces the idea of the democratic inclusive 
planning procedure.
The plan clearly states that social justice would be 
realized through two main objectives: doubling the na-
tional income of Egypt within a decade 23 and achiev-
ing full employment.24 Egypt was showing steady 
macroeconomic growth during the Mubarak era, 
based on its open economic structure. The new plan 
emphasizes the importance of growth with this eco-
nomic framework, supplementing factors that were 
lacking in previous plans, which could be described as 
inclusiveness.
In fact, the Income Doubling Plan (1960) in Japan, as 
introduced in the previous chapter, was the model for 
this new plan. Considering not only positive lessons, 
but also the downsides of the Japanese plan (i.e. envi-
ronmental disruption and overconcentration) (Honma, 
1999), social and environmental sustainability was 
added into the Egyptian version.
Planning Approach: A Plan as a Guiding 
Vision
The first major feature of the new plan is its strategic 
framework, acting as a guiding vision for national de-
velopment. The plan considered eight social goals, 10 
challenges and opportunities for Egypt, and five key 
issues to be studied, as described in Figure 10. The 
plan also includes the fundamental idea of compre-
hensively utilizing the strength and opportunities pos-
sessed by the country. Taking into account the crisis of 
revolution and future economic development, the plan 
adopts a phased approach dividing the decade into 
three phases, as described in Table 7, so that the ob-
jectives and inputs could be adjusted according to the 
development level. The plan is regarded as the Master 
Plan or a Strategic Framework for a decade, and is to 
be followed by an Execution Plan in each phase. This 
idea was based on the Japanese development phased 
approach after World War II.
Establishing the Planning Committee: 
Building an Institutional Consensus-
Building Mechanism
Planning Committee
The introduction of inclusive planning was one of the 
achievements of the Ministry of Planning during the 
transitional government period.  Currently, the plan’s 
greatest challenge is to include the interests of civil, 
EFFORTS TO INTRODUCE “INCLUSIVE PLANNING” IN EGYPT  23
Figure 10: Planning Approach
Source: Author based on Draft Master Plan and JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
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public and private sector stakeholders. Given the var-
ied, and often conflicting interest of these sectors, a 
structured dialogue mechanism was necessary to help 
build consensus among policy-related issues. Indeed 
in the absence of such a mechanism, many experts 
agree that attempts to increase dialogue might only 
lead to an increase in chaos. Based on these points, 
the Japanese Economic Council served as an exem-
plar to build a consensus institutionally
The idea of establishing the Planning Committee un-
der the instruction of the Minister of Planning was to 
unify the ideas and voices of major stakeholders and 
build a national vision based on the consensus in the 
committee. The committee’s mission involved inte-
grating the varied interests and opinions of the public 
sector (represented by public social organizations), 
technicians and professionals (academics, engineers 
and experts), and stakeholder opinion (social group 
representatives). Within the Planning Committee, nine 
study groups and one editing team were established. 
This was just a first step, but important for the intro-
duction of inclusive planning. Fixing and strengthen-
ing this institution as the system evolves is important 
and necessary for Egypt.
Table 7: Economic Targets of the Plan Based on Three Phases
1. Phase 1 
Social Recovery Phase:  
2012 to 2014 (2 years ±1)
Stabilization of the political environment (Election, president and 
constitution).
Social institution design and implementation.
Socio-economic recovery start (3-5 percent GDP growth).
2. Phase 2 
Socio-Economic 
Independence Phase:  
2014 to 2019 (5 years ±1)
Private sector leads economy.
Investment by domestic capital.
Industrialization balancing (1st, 2nd and 3rd industries).
3. Phase 3 
Socio–Socio-Economic 
Growing Shift Phase:  
2019 to 2022 (3 years ±1)
Social stabilization and living standard enhancement.
Socio-economic system shifts to industrial structure.
Source: Author based on JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
Table 8: Purpose of the Planning Committee
1. Clarifying the social conflict and trying to create social harmonization among Egyptian society.
2. Neutral and fairness of the administration.
3. Combining specialized experiences in different fields.
4. Building consensus in the administration.
5. Establishing democratic and effective approach.
Source: Draft Master Plan and JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
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Effects of the Planning Committee
The major effect of the Planning Committee is the 
establishment of “a national consensus-building 
mechanism,” which will also facilitate the integration 
of knowledge and strengthen plan implementation. 
For decades, people in Egypt were expected to follow 
the president’s decision, but the establishment of the 
Planning Committee will empower people to decide 
their future visions for themselves. 
Figure 11: Mechanism of the Egyptian Planning Committee
Source: World Governance Indicators. 
Planning Formation (Planning Committee)
Table 9: Planning Effects
1. Common Place Effect Public and private sectors can discuss the goal.
2. Consensus Effect Stakeholders can reach a common understanding and social goal.
3. Certainty Effect Reducing uncertainty to encourage future investment.
4. Announcement Effect Showing the future picture and policy for synergy effect.
5. Maximizing Effect Stimulating potential growing power to the highest level.
Source: Draft Master Plan and JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
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Planning Integration: Integrating the 
Scattered Knowledge in Egypt
Integration of Wisdom and Knowledge in the 
Planning Committee
The planning committee played an important role in 
integrating existing wisdom and knowledge in Egypt. 
Experts from various fields gathered in the Planning 
Committee and nine working groups were established, 
with 21 experts, to draft the plan. The authors’ names, 
which did not appear in the previous versions of the 
plan, were given for reasons of accountability.
The effort of integrating this expertise has just 
started. Private and civil sectors have not yet been 
included in the planning process, where around 200 
members gathered to draft the Japanese Income 
Doubling Plan. The future challenge for Egypt is to 
include various experts from the private sector, civil 
organizations, the media, etc. 
Integration of Existing Plans, Strategies and 
Visions
The planning committee also contributed toward reor-
ganizing existing plans in Egypt. The existing 41 plans 
were listed and studied to consider the strength and 
potential in Egypt, assuming that the existing plans 
were not used effectively enough. From this effort, 
the potential strength in Egypt has been reconsid-
ered, allowing them to devise a strategic framework, 
as described in the previous section. The planning 
committee contributed to integrating the wisdom and 
knowledge that had accumulated in Egypt.
Strengthening the Capacity of Brain 
Institutions: Institute of National Planning 
(INP)
The Institute of National Planning (INP) is another ef-
fort to integrate the scattered knowledge involved in 
strengthening the Ministry of Planning to support the 
planning process, both technically and academically. 
INP was a research think tank under the Ministry of 
Planning that played an important role in the planning 
process. During the process of integrating knowledge, 
the planning committee and INP found that existing 
laws were scattered, and had difficulties in referring 
to important laws and documents while drafting a 
new plan.
Therefore, the “E-Library” was established inside the 
INP and all existing laws and important government 
documents were scanned electronically to create a 
large database maintained in the E-Library. Work on 
knowledge integration is still underway in the INP.
Strengthening the Mechanism of 
Implementation
Relating the Master Plan and Policy 
Execution
Our study showed the great importance of plan imple-
mentation. When drafting and implementing a plan, 
the importance of linking the national planning and 
policymaking was considered during the planning 
process and the Japanese plan applied a phased ap-
proach. The Income Doubling Plan was defined as a 
master plan, as it holds the perspective of long-term 
growth and acts as a guideline for mid-term and an-
nual plans. The idea of strengthening and structuring 
the relation with the master plan and the execution 
plan is important for implementation. The two Figures 
(12 and 13) indicate the structure of the master plan 
and policy relation.
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Figure 12: Relation with Policy Execution
Figure 13: Master Plan and Relation with Execution Plans
Source: Draft Master Plan and JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
Source: Draft Master Plan and JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
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Establishing SNAP
The Malaysian experience shows the importance of 
a strong implementation system and body in achiev-
ing the goals stated in the plan. Egypt is establish-
ing an implementation structure, and the new plan 
clearly states the importance of the implementation 
stage. For a strong implementation body, the new plan 
proposes to establish the Strategic National Project 
Execution Unit (SNAP) under the Ministry of Planning 
and puts forward the SNAP as the national project 
manager in an effort to link the planning and imple-
mentation functions.
Challenges for Inclusive Planning
 Finally, some of the challenges faced by Egypt in 
introducing inclusive planning will be raised. Indeed, 
the experience of establishing a planning commit-
tee was a first and important step toward reforming 
the planning process. However, we are still at the 
start, with numerous further challenges to overcome. 
First, the participation of stakeholders is incomplete. 
Members from nine ministries, private sectors, local 
governments and media were still missing in the plan-
ning committee. To build consensus and strengthen 
implementation, efforts and coordination to ensure 
implementers participate in the planning procedure is 
crucial. Second, the plan was prepared by the interim 
government, and the idea must be shared with the 
new government established in July 2012. President 
Morsi holds a new “Nahda Program,” which resembles 
an election manifesto, sharing common features 
with inclusive planning. Inclusive planning should be 
adapted to the new government’s plans and policy. 
Third, the inclusion of the military as a large stake-
holder in Egypt will be a big challenge. A large portion 
Figure 14: Strengthening Implementation Body in Egypt
Source: Draft Master Plan and JICA expert presentation materials, 2012.
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Box 2: Coalition with the Nahda Program
 
The About the Program
The Al-Nahda (renaissance) program is the Muslim Brotherhood’s 11 page manifesto for the presidential 
election that was published as a hard copy on April 28, 2012, and has become the economic and social 
strategic plan for current President Morsi’s administration. The program stemmed from meetings, which 
started in 2003, hosted by Khairat El-Shater; the current deputy leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
was rewritten as part of the Brotherhood’s election manifesto (Howeidy, 2012b). The plan aims to achieve 
social justice and emphasizes a greater role for the private sector and civil society. It also sets out eco-
nomic targets such as doubling domestic production in five years, based on an annual economic growth 
rate of 6.5-7 percent. With emphasis on social justice, the program regards the state, private sector and 
civil society as the three principle stakeholders, and suggests that reaching consensus on a national vi-
sion toward the plan’s implementation is crucial (ibid). 
Coalition with Inclusive Planning
The strategic goals of income doubling, emphasis on social justice and national consensus-building are 
some of the points to be shared among the Nahda program and the new development plan. There is 
also significant potential for inclusive planning to cooperate and supplement functions for achieving the 
Nahda program’s goals. The Nahda Program has been drafted by the Muslim Brotherhood, where the 
spokesman told that “the Islamic project is nonnegotiable” (Daily News Egypt, 2012). However, the pro-
gram must also contribute to the 75 percent of citizens who did not vote for the Brotherhood, and build 
consensus among a wide range of stakeholders, including implementers. Also, technical procedures and 
mechanisms; such as the establishment of a planning committee, SNAP and concrete industrial policies 
are not discussed in the program. Inclusive planning can complement these parts to the Nahda program. 
In addition, it should be noted that as well as short-term policy in the form of “100-day projects,” a long-
term perspective for inclusive growth is also crucial at this stage.
of the economy is run by the military. Including the 
huge economic activities of the military in the plan is 
one important task for inclusive planning. Fourth, con-
sideration of Islamist thoughts toward the economy is 
becoming increasingly important. With the increase in 
stakeholders, which was examined in the first chapter, 
more and more topics require further examination. 
However, with the effective inclusion of stakeholders 
within the institutional mechanism framework and by 
applying other state’s experiences and Egypt’s poten-
tial strengths, these challenges should be controllable.
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Box 3: Comparison with Tunisia’s Jasmine Plan (Economic and Social Program for  
2012-2016
TheThe new economic and social five-year plan after the revolution in Tunisia, the “Jasmine Plan,” was 
announced by the Ministry of Finance in September 2011. The plan had three aspects: managing the 
crisis after the revolution, promoting the transition toward democracy, and promoting sustainable social 
and economic development. For the first time in Tunisia, the plan was explicitly based on the concept 
of social justice, where almost half the targets among 10 were related to the democratization process 
(African Development Bank, 2012).
The Jasmine Plan shares the basic idea of inclusive growth, where there is still significant potential to 
share experiences with the Egyptian inclusive planning.
Table 10: Challenges and Strategies in the Jasmine Plan
Challenges
1. Human development, social and regional inclusion
2. Governance, social responsibility and citizen participation
3. Employability, job creation and sophistication of the economy
4. Global integration
5. Financing of the economy
6. Environment and management of natural resources
Strategies
1. Establishing trust through transparency, social responsibility and citizen participation.
2. Ensuring that development is all-inclusive and equitably shared amongst the different social strata. 
3. Promoting a knowledge-based economy, in which science and technology will play significantly 
enhanced roles.
4. Creating favorable conditions to promote productivity, and free-entrepreneurship.
5. Fostering integration into the world economy.
6. Investing in human capital through education and training, and fostering professional competency in 
all fields.
7. Promoting social justice and equal opportunity programs.
8. Ensuring an adequate, balanced and viable financing of the economy.
9. Rehabilitate public service and civil action.
10. Optimizing the efficient utilization of resources and the preservation of the environment.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tunisia 2011.
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS
The Egyptian revolution in 2011 was a historical event 
that will have a lasting impact on world politics, eco-
nomic and social commentary. Almost two years have 
passed, and the country is steadily moving toward a 
new history, with its first democratically elected presi-
dent. Before the revolution, Egypt showed steady eco-
nomic growth; but growth that was inequitable and in 
which the benefits of growth were grossly unequal. 
The Arab uprising incident highlighted the fundamen-
tal desires of the Egyptian people who simply sought 
social justice and who were desperate to prevent their 
country from becoming further mired in the insidious 
effects of endemic corruption. Moreover, as this paper 
has revealed, the absence of a consensus-building dia-
logue system significantly helped fuel an environment 
of escalating corruption, a knowledge diaspora and an 
impotent implementation processes.
As examined in application in Japan, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, the inclusive planning model demonstrates 
how economic growth and inclusiveness go hand-
in-hand. The Japanese economic planning council 
system, the Indonesian experience of a participatory 
planning process during the democratization period, 
and the Malaysian experience of strengthening the 
implementation mechanism provide a framework of 
reference, indeed a malleable blueprint, which could 
be applicable to Egypt.
Egypt’s movement toward drafting a master plan 
and establishing a planning committee represents 
important steps toward achieving inclusive develop-
ment. The interim government has also recently taken 
steps toward building an inclusive planning procedure, 
which, once firmly established, could be fully utilized 
by the new government. Inclusive planning transcends 
political regimes. Indeed, it is apolitical as it is based 
on the facilitation of varied stakeholders. This feature 
in particular could help provide the necessary frame-
work for establishing a national consensus; one built 
on integrated knowledge, visions, and strategies.
East Asian economic growth and growth experiences 
worldwide demonstrate that international assistance 
can be effectively utilized to support development. 
The incidents of 2011, including Japan’s devastating 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster, further 
demonstrate the immense value of international co-
operation in supporting Japan’s recovery. Indeed, it 
is reminiscent of the global cooperation that helped 
fuel Japan’s remarkable recovery after World War II. 
Similarly, in nations such as Egypt and Tunisia, with 
histories of social, political and economic instability, 
experts such as Kaufman believe close collabora-
tion with other nations may help ensure stability 
(Kaufman, 2011). Likewise, the importance of estab-
lishing links with countries such as Indonesia would 
offer similar benefits.
 Finally, while economic assistance plays an indispens-
able role, it should not be used as a vehicle to impose 
a particular political ideology. Rather, it should be an 
apolitical instrument that facilitates a nation’s redis-
covery of its inherent strengths and collective wisdom 
– national treasures long buried under a pyramid of 
corruption in Egypt. Inclusive planning, in this context, 
implies the inclusion of, and respect toward, a coun-
try’s people, culture, thoughts and history. 
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ENDNOTES
1. The Ministry of Planning became the Ministry of 
Planning and International Cooperation in 2011.
2. Tinbergen states the importance of “Outside 
contacts” during the planning process (Tinber-
gen,1964).
3. Based on a field interview, July 2012.
4. Based on a field interview, July 2012.
5. Based on a field interview, July 2012.
6. “Soft State” is a term introduced by Gunnar 
Myrdal in 1968 to describe a state with weak 
governance. Amin cited in Nagasawa (Amin 2011, 
Nagasawa, 2012) indicates that Egypt rolls down 
to become a “Soft State” in Sadat and Mubarak 
era. The Muslim Brotherhood often uses the term 
“Deep State” to refer to the old regime’s hold-
overs.
7. Former deputy secretary general of National 
Democratic Party.
8. Former owner of Ezz Steel and former chairman 
of Egypt’s national assembly’s budget committee.
9. World Bank, World Governance Indicators, ac-
cessed on July 18, 2012 <http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.
10. Data from International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
July 2012.
11. Data from the Central Bank of Egypt, July 2012.
12. For example, a comparison with the elections re-
sults after the revolution indicates the diversifica-
tion of political parties in politics.
13. Based on field interview, July 2012.
14. Only the Soviet Union had economic planning be-
fore the World War II (Keizaikikakucho, 1997).
15. This paper adopts the stance that the definitions 
of “Governance” and “Democracy” need to be 
carefully studied, since the development experi-
ences of individual countries differ.
16. The Council was called the “Shingikai” in Japa-
nese.
17. Data in 2010. The Economic Council was one of 
the councils but was dissolved in 2011.
18. Providing a vision to the private sector was pos-
sible since the private sector was also included as 
a member of the Planning Committee.
19. Conversely, it should be noted that negative as-
pects such as environmental pollution was ex-
panded among the Japanese land.
20. Nine development plans have been drafted to 
date.
21. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
dispatched an expert to Ministry of Planning as 
an advisor.
22. Currently, the plan is under public review on the 
Ministry of Planning Website <http://www.mop.
gov.eg/english/english.html> accessed on Dec. 11, 
2012.
23. Doubling the national income is defined as dou-
bling the real national income, which requires an 
average annual growth rate of 7.5% GDP growth/
year.
24. Achieving full employment is defined as reducing 
the unemployment rate to less than 4%.
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